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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF STATE "SHRINK-WRAP"
LICENSE STATUTES IN LIGHT OF VAULT CORP. v.
QUAID SOFTWARE, LTD.
Software piracy represents an important loss of business to the
computer software' industry.2 The software industry contends that
rental companies that loan copyrighted software for a limited time
period to users for a fee promote software piracy because some
renters make unauthorized copies of the software before returning
the original.3 Such unauthorized copying violates the federal Copy-
right Act of 1976 (the "Copyright Act") 4 which subjects those who
make unauthorized copies of computer software to federal civil and
criminal penalties.5
However, copyright owners find it difficult to enforce their
rights under the Copyright Act against individuals who make unau-
thorized copies of copyrighted software.6 In response to this diffi-
culty, Illinois and Louisiana recently enacted statutes7 designed to
protect a copyright holders' intellectual property rights in computer
software.8 These statutes purport to standardize and enforce
"shrink-wrap" 9 licensing agreements for mass market computer
1 The term "computer software" means "computer program," defined by the
Copyright Act of 1976 as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). "Computer software" thus includes both operating sys-
tems, compilers, interpreters, and application programs.
2 See, e.g., Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tear-Me-Open " Software License Agreements, 67
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 509, 510 (1985) ("According to industry estimates
there may exist anywhere between 2 and 10 'unauthorized' copies for every copy of mass
marketed software purchased from the publisher [resulting in] lost profits for the com-
puter industry in the range of $500 million to $2.5 billion annually."); Note, The Protec-
tion of Computer Software Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1347, 1348 n.2 (1985) (authored by Karen Puhala) ("approximately 50% of existing
software in the personal computer marketplace is pirated").
3 Stem, Shrink-wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or
Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 51, 57 (1985) (Software mar-
keters legitimately complain that "software 'rental' is generally merely a euphemism for
'software piracy'....").
4 17 U.S.C. § 106.
5 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510.
6 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 801-808 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-
1966 (West 1987).
8 This note deals exclusively with intellectual property owners' rights in computer
software under federal and state law when there is no dispute over the validity or en-
forceability of the copyright under federal law.
9 The term "shrink-wrap" refers to the clear plastic wrapping that seals the
software box and through which buyers can read the license agreement.
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software packages. 10 These agreements offer to the "purchaser""1I a
license to use the software, which the "purchaser" legally accepts
when he tears open the shrink-wrap.
State "shrink-wrap" laws attempt to protect software publish-
ers' property interest 12 in their software by making "shrink-wrap"
license agreements enforceable.' 3 The copyright owner gains sev-
eral advantages from licensing software rather than selling it. For
example, the Copyright Act limits the copyright owner's ability to
restrict the actions of someone who has purchased a copy of the
software, 14 while a licensor of the same software can restrict the ac-
tivities of his licensee.
This note concludes that state "shrink-wrap" laws are invalid
and unenforceable because they fall within the preemption provi-
sions of the Copyright Act.' 5 Section II of this note examines the
effectiveness of the Copyright Act in protecting computer software
and the case law defining the scope of the rights protected under the
Copyright Act. Section III discusses the purpose and provisions of
"shrink-wrap" license agreements and their enforceability in the ab-
sence of state "shrink-wrap" laws. Section IV examines the scope
and effectiveness of the Louisiana and Illinois "shrink-wrap" stat-
10 "Mass marketed computer software packages" refers to computer software pro-
duced for the general public and not individually designed to meet the needs of a partic-
ular customer.
1 When dealing with "shrink-wrap" license agreements, an inherent difficulty ex-
ists in labeling the two parties to the transaction as either "sellers" and "purchasers" on
the one hand or "licensors" and "licensees" on the other. This note uses both sets of
labels and the particular context of the discussion determines the meaning of these
terms. Ultimately, this note concludes that all "shrink-wrap" licensees are actually pur-
chasers, so in this context the terms are interchangeable.
12 Federal copyright law does not protect ideas but it does protect a particular ex-
pression of ideas. Software developers must therefore rely on state trade secret law to
protect the ideas in their programs. See, e.g., Kemp, Trade Secret and Copyright Protection for
Mass Marketed Computer Programs, 90 CoM. LJ. 625 (1985).
13 "Shrink-wrap" license agreements typically provide that the licensor retains title
in the copy. They also restrict the licensee's right to copy, modify, adapt, reverse engi-
neer, dissemble, create derivative works based on the software (Section 101 of the Copy-
right Act defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works." 17 U.S.C. § 101) or further transfer, assign, rent, or sell the licensed copy. "Re-
verse engineering" and "dissembling" refer to the conversion of software which is in
machine-readable form into a human-readable form. By reverse engineering or disas-
sembling, a programmer can discover how a program works, make changes, or take the
ideas used by the original programmer and apply them in his own program.
14 The "first sale" doctrine, embodied in section 109 of the Copyright Act, pro-
vides that "the owner of a particular copy . . . made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy .... 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). See
infra note 49 and accompanying text.
15 The preemption pr6vides that all rights equivalent to the exclusive rights
granted by the Copyright Act are governed exclusively by the Copyright Act and cannot
be granted by common law or state statutes. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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utes. Section V discusses Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd, 16 in which
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that several provi-
sions of the Louisiana "shrink-wrap" statute are unenforceable. Fi-
nally, section VI examines the enforceability of those provisions of
the "shrink-wrap" statutes not addressed by the Vault decision. This
note concludes that these state "shrink-wrap" statutes are invalid
and unenforceable because they purport to grant rights that are
either equivalent to or in direct conflict with rights granted under
the Copyright Act.
I
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Owners of intellectual property rights in computer software can
protect their interests through five means: 17 (1) federal patent
law,' 8 (2) federal copyright law, t9 (3) state trade secret law, 20 (4)
contract, 21 and (5) "copy protection." 22 Traditionally, trade secret
law and individual contracts have been the most important means of
protection but with the increasing economic importance and preva-
16 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), af'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
17 For discussion of general means of protection of rights in software, see Hyde,
Legal Protection of Computer Software, 59 CONN. B.J. 298 (1985) and Syrowik, Intellectual
Property Rights in Software-A Look at the Basics, 65 MIcH. B.J. 292 (1986).
18 Computer software is not generally considered to be patentable subject matter
under the federal patent statute. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982). However, in Daimond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Supreme Court held that an industrial process which
utilized a computer program for control purposes was patentable subject matter. Never-
theless, patent protection remains unavailable for software out of such applied contexts.
19 The 1980 Computer Software Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1982), which amended
the Copyright Act of 1976, explicitly extended federal copyright protection to cover
computer software.
20 Protection under state trade secret law generally requires a showing that the
computer program is novel, that it represents value to its owner, and that the owner
intended to keep the contents of the program secret. Intent to maintain secrecy
presents the greatest problem to developers of mass-market software because purchas-
ers can easily discover the contents of the program and nothing legally hinders them
from doing so. Software developers therefore use licensing as a way to require users to
use the software only for its intended purpose and to prevent the appropriation of its
trade secrets. See, e.g., Kemp, supra note 12; Note, supra note 2, at 1356.
21 Direct contracting between the parties in a transfer of software allows the trans-
feror to structure the transfer as a license, rather than a sale, and thus "bind the user to
restrictions on the use of the program and promises of confidentiality by contract." Ei-
delman & Shepherd, Living Among Pirates: Practical Strategies to Protect Computer Software, 65
MicH. B.J. 284, 287 (1986).
22 "Copy protection" involves the marketing of software on "copy-protected" me-
dia, such as floppy disks. Copy protection prevents or frustrates attempts by unauthor-
ized end users or other parties to copy the software contained on the protected disk.
Although making unauthorized copying impossible is clearly the best means of securing
for the copyright owner the sole right to make copies of the software, copy protection
schemes can be "broken." They also have the disadvantage of preventing end users
from making legitimate back-up copies which makes copy protection unpopular with
users. Id at 285. See also infra note 29.
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lence of packaged mass market software, federal copyright law and
"copy protection" have gained in importance. 23 The interaction be-
tween federal copyright law and state contract law, in the form of
the "shrink-wrap" statutes, has also gained in importance as
software developers attempt to use "shrink-wrap" license agree-
ments to broaden the protection offered under the Copyright Act.
The primary economic concern of software developers and
publishers is to receive a profitable return on their investment of
time, capital, and effort through the sale of their product to the con-
suming public. The copyright owner of computer software has the
exclusive right to make and distribute copies of that software.24
However, given the high price of software development, the corre-
spondingly high retail price charged to the consumer, and the ease
and inexpense with which software can be illegally copied, "pirates"
of computer software have an incentive to circumvent the copyright
owner's exclusive right.25
While the Copyright Act provides civil and criminal remedies
against this unauthorized appropriation, 26 enforcement of the copy-
right owner's exclusive rights against individual end-user infringers
is extremely difficult, given the inherent problems and expense of
investigation, proof, and prosecution. 27 Copyright suits are more
effective against producers and distributors of unauthorized copies
of copyrighted software than against the thousands of individual
users who may pass an unauthorized copy on to a friend. Suing nu-
merous individuals who have each made only one unauthorized
copy of a piece of software is not a cost-effective means of protect-
ing intellectual property rights, notwithstanding the option of suing
for statutory damages under the Copyright Act.28 Thus, the
software industry has turned to alternative means of protection.
Other means of protecting intellectual property interests in
software include: (1) state trade secret law protection, which can be
23 The traditional market for software was among large industrial and commercial
users whose applications require specialized and custom-designed software. With such
transactions, the software developers could easily resort to contract to secure their prop-
erty interest in the software. Stern, supra note 3, at 51.
24 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3).
25 See Stern, supra note 3, at 51 ("The price of software is quite high relative to the
cost of its duplication, which is relatively easy and undetectable. The business setting,
therefore, is ideal for 'piracy.' ").
26 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-509.
27 Stern, supra note 3, at 52 ("Detecting piracy in individual or corporate end user
contexts is extremely difficult, and detection rarely occurs.").
28 Statutory damages consist of an award of not less than $250 or more than
$10,000 for all infringements involved in one action with respect to one copyrighted
work. If however, the plaintiff can prove the infringement was willfully committed, the
damage award may be increased to as much as $50,000 per cause of action. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c).
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used to protect the ideas embodied in software, (2) an enforceable
contract between the owner of the intellectual property and the
party that will use it, by which the copyright owner licenses the
software to the user with restrictions on use, transfer, reverse engi-
neering, and promises of secrecy and, (3) physical means such as
"copy protection" of computer floppy disks.29
Each of these alternative methods represents an advantage over
protection under copyright alone. While copyright protects only
the author's expression,30 state trade secret law protects the ideas
behind that expression. 31 Furthermore, while selling a copy of a
copyrighted work ends the copyright owner's control over subse-
quent transfers of and modifications to the copy,32 the copyright
owner can maintain control over an individual copy of the software
through a licensing contract.33 Finally, "copy-protection" makes
unauthorized copying or modification of copyrighted software phys-
ically difficult or impossible, thereby enabling the copyright owner
to avoid or diminish the possibility of the need for future legal
protection. 34
All of these advantages point to deficiencies in the protection
offered software under the Copyright Act. But the mere existence
of devices and schemes to increase intellectual property protection
beyond that offered through federal copyright does not ensure their
legal availability, for they may conflict with the preemption provi-
sion of the Copyright Act.35
A. Protection of Copyrighted Works
The Copyright Act establishes copyright protection in "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," 36
29 "Copy protection" is a means of defeating the disk copying utility of the com-
puter's operating system. If a disk containing software is copy protected, the user will be
unable to make a copy of its contents unless he obtains and uses another utility specially
designed to defeat the copy protection scheme. See supra note 22.
30 17 U.S.C. § 102. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
31 Note, supra note 2, at 1356-57 (noting that, while trade secret law can protect
ideas, it is generally unavailable for mass market software).
32 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("the owner of a particular copy.., is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy").
33 See Note, supra note 2, at 1350 (noting that courts have generally upheld the use
of licensing agreements to protect intellectual property interests in computer software).
34 Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 21, at 284 ("Physical protection of the program
should always come first-if it is never stolen in the first place [the copyright owner]
doesn't have to spend expensive dollars litigating to protect it.").
35 17 U.S.C. § 301. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
36 17 U.S.C. § 102. By giving specifically enumerated exclusive rights to the owner
of the copyright in a work, the Copyright Act seeks to promote the production of crea-
tive work through the creation of limited monopolies in the copyright owner. Sony
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and grants certain exclusive rights to copyright owners.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act establishes that the copyright
owner 37 has the exclusive right to carry out or to authorize (1) the
reproduction of the copyrighted work,38 (2) the preparation of de-
rivative works based on the copyrighted work,39 (3) the distribution
of copies of the copyrighted work by sale, rental, lease, or lending,40
(4) the public performance, 41 or (5) public display42 of the copy-
righted work.
The present Copyright Act preempts all state laws that (1) affect
rights "equivalent" to the exclusive rights enumerated in the Copy-
right Act, (2) concern works that fall within the subject matter re-
quirements of the Copyright Act, and (3) involve causes of action
arising after 1978.43 The Copyright Act's preemption provision is
relevant to the validity of the state "shrink-wrap" laws because these
state statutes purport to grant rights to copyright owners which may
be within the exclusive domain of the Copyright Act.
The subject matter of federal copyright protection 44 includes
such traditional forms of authorship as literary, musical, dramatic,
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) ("The monopoly created
by copyright... rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.").
37 "Copyright owner" means the owner of "any one of the exclusive rights [enu-
merated in section 106) comprised in a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
38 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
39 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
40 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
41 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
42 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
43 17 U.S.C. § 301(b). Prior to 1978, two copyright regimes existed in the United
States: the federal Copyright Act of 1909, Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35
Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § § 1-215) which protected published works, and
state common-law copyright which protected unpublished works. "Publication" is de-
fined in the Copyright Act of 1976 as "the distribution of copies ... of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. Congress rationalized the federal copyright regime's exclusivity by claiming it
enhanced the effectiveness of the protection afforded copyrighted works in the United
States.
The House Report, commenting on the version of the bill which would become the
Act, states:
By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachronistic, un-
certain, impractical, and highly complicated dual system [of federal statu-
tory copyright protection for published works and state common law
copyright protection for unpublished works], the bill would greatly im-
prove the operation of the copyright law and would be much more effec-
tive in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the
promotion of writing and scholarship.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659.
44 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.").
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pictorial, and audiovisual works. 45 The 1980 Computer Software
Act,46 an amendment to the Copyright Act, explicitly extended fed-
eral copyright protection to computer software.
B. Limitations on the Enumerated Rights
Although the Copyright Act protects intellectual property
rights by granting copyright owners monopolies over the reproduc-
tion, distribution, and preparation of derivative works of their copy-
righted software, it also imposes important limitations on the scope
and effectiveness of copyright protection. For example, section 117
of the Copyright Act gives those who purchase a copy47 of copy-
righted computer software the right to make another copy of the
software if the user creates the new copy either as an essential step
in using the software or for archival purposes. 48 This statutory ex-
ception poses potential problems for enforcing "shrink-wrap" li-
cense agreements that purport to do away with the users' ability to
make any copies or modifications to the licensed software.
The "first sale" doctrine of section 109 of the Copyright Act
also significantly limits the copyright owners' exclusive rights over
their copyrighted works. Section 109(a), which establishes the "first
sale" doctrine, provides that once the copyright owner sells an au-
thorized copy of a copyrighted work, the copyright owner can no
longer control its disposition or further transfer.49 Under the "first
sale" doctrine, therefore, a consumer who buys a copy of a com-
puter software package at a retail store can lend it to his friends,
even for consideration, or sell it to a third party, despite the poten-
tial for copyright infringement inherent in such transfers.
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner are further limited
because the Copyright Act does not protect the underlying ideas or
algorithms of computer software but only the author's particular-
ized expression of an idea.50 The Copyright Act thus does not pro-
45 17 U.S.C. § 102.
46 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117.
47 "Copies" are defined by the Copyright Act as "material objects ... in which a
work is fixed by any method ... and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17
U.S.C. § 101.
48 17 U.S.C. § 117. See also Hyde, supra note 17, at 311.
49 Section 109(a) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [which gives the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted
work to the public], the owner of a particular copy . . .lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, with-
out the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
50 Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides that "Copyright protection subsists
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hibit third parties from decompiling or disassembling a computer
program, discovering the idea expressed in it, and then writing their
own program using different instructions and organization, but pro-
ducing the same or similar result.51 While state trade secret laws
have traditionally protected underlying ideas that the author effec-
tively kept secret,52 mass market sellers generally cannot obtain
state trade secret law protection. 53
Finally, the limited monopoly granted the copyright owner
under the Copyright Act does not last forever. Section 302(a) states
the general rule that copyright protection "endures for a term con-
sisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's
death." 54 This length of time is typically much greater than the eco-
nomic life of any piece of computer software. Limited copyright life
is therefore relevant only when license agreements purport to pro-
hibit copying by licensees for a period of time longer than the copy-
right term. In such instances, these license provisions conflict with
the Copyright Act.55
C. The Scope of "Equivalent" Rights
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law protection
of the intellectual property rights granted in section 106. Section
.. in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.... In
no case does copyright protection extend to any idea .... 17 U.S.C. § 102.
51 See Note, supra note 2, at 1353 ("The always ambiguous line between copying an
idea and borrowing the expression is especially uncertain in the context of computer
software.").
52 State trade secret law requires proof that the owner of the ideas made an effort to
keep them secret and that the party against whom the action is brought misappropriated
it. Protection under trade secret law is usually limited to situations in which the proprie-
tary owner has required all those who will come into contact with the secret to enter into
a contract of confidentiality. It is difficult to enter such contracts in the mass-market
context, which lacks face-to-face bargaining. Mass-market sellers therefore cannot gen-
erally obtain state trade secret protection. Consequently, software developers have
turned to "shrink-wrap" licensing as a means of protecting their secrets by attempting to
eliminate purchasers' rights to make duplicate copies of their software. Testerman,
Legal Protection of Computers: Trade Secrets, Copyright and Newly Enacted Louisiana Statutes, 32
LA. Bus. J. 290, 291 (1985).
53 See Note, supra note 2, at 1356-57.
54 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
55 The "fair use" doctrine, embodied in section 107 of the Copyright Act is another
important exception to the copyright owner's exclusive rights. The "fair use" exception
acts as a limitation on the copyright owner's section 106 exclusive rights and permits the
reproduction of a copyrighted work for scholarship or research, weighing factors such as
the use to be made of the copy, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
importance of the portion used, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for
the copyrighted work. The existence of this exception to the copyright owner's exclu-
sive right of reproduction calls into question the validity of provisions for the absolute
prohibition of duplication of copyrighted software, such as those that exist in typical
"shrink-wrap" license agreements.
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301(a) states that "no person is entitled to any such right [as those
set out in section 106] or equivalent right... under the common
law or statutes of any State." 56 Section 301(b) provides that the
Copyright Act does not preempt state law from addressing (1) sub-
ject matter that does not come within the scope of the Act's protec-
tion,5 7 (2) causes of action arising before the effective date of the
statute,58 and (3) rights "that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights" of the Act.59 The enforceability and validity of state
"shrink-wrap" laws thus depend on the meaning of "equivalent
rights" and the resulting applicability or non-applicability of section
301.
Courts and commentators have struggled to define the scope
and meaning of the section 301 (a) preemption provision in the com-
puter software context.60 Courts have developed two distinct tests
to determine whether section 301 preempts a state law-the "extra
element" test and the federal policy test.6 1
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises62 established
the "extra element" test. In deciding whether section 301(a) pre-
empted the plaintiff's state law claims, the Harper & Row court com-
pared the rights the plaintiff sought to protect under the state and
56 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
57 The subject matter of the Copyright Act is set out in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
58 The effective date of the Copyright Act is January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
59 17 U.S.C. § 301(b).
60 The Copyright Act does not preempt state trade secret law. Warrington Assoc.,
Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981) is a typical example
of the judicial treatment in this area which involved the alleged misappropriation of
trade secrets in computer software. The district court found that because copyright law
only protects expressions and not the underlying ideas that are the subject of state trade
secret protection, there is no overlap between federal copyright law and state trade se-
cret law. 522 F. Supp. at 368. Relying on reasoning in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), in which the Supreme Court "found nothing incompatible
between the law of trade secrets and federal patent statutes," id. at 493, the district court
held that the plaintiff's state law claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act. 522 F.
Supp. at 369. In a recent district court case, Southern Mississippi Planning & Dev. Dist.,
Inc. v. Robertson, 660 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Miss. 1986), the court followed Warrington
Assoc. and held that "an analysis of the interest secured by copyright and trade secret law
demonstrates that the claims are not 'equivalent' as intended by Congress." 660 F.
Supp. at 1061.
61 In his treatise on copyright, Nimmer states the test for preemption:
[A] right which is "equivalent to copyright" is one which is infringed by
the mere act of reproduction [or] distribution .... If under state law the
act of reproduction [or] distribution . . .will in itself infringe the state
created right, then such right is preempted. But if other elements are
required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction [or] distri-
bution ... in order to constitute a state created cause of action, then the
right does not lie "within the general scope of copyright," and there is no
preemption.
1 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at 1-11 to 1-12 (1987).
62 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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federal laws. 63 The court stated that "[t]he state cause of action
must protect rights .. .which are qualitatively different from the
rights of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display."' '
According to the Harper & Row court, it is not dispositive whether a
state claim contains a different number of elements of proof than a
federal copyright claim.65 Although the court implied in dicta that a
valid state cause of action must contain an extra element to distin-
guish it from a copyright action, the court stated that additional ele-
ments do not preclude a finding of preemption. 66
Elaborating on the "extra element" test, the district court in
Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd.67 examined the Copyright Act's
legislative history and judicial interpretation to determine whether
plaintiff's state law claims "protect[ed] rights that are 'equivalent' to
those protected by federal copyright."6 The court concluded that
the federal statutes preempted state misappropriation law whenever
the subject matter fell within the scope of federal protection.69 The
court noted the need to examine the particular facts of each case
when making a preemption determination, rather than relying on
superficial differences between state and federal claims in the plain-
tiff's pleadings. 70 The Wedgwood court concluded that the "extra el-
ement" of plaintiff's cause of action must be such that it "changes
the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a
copyright infringement claim."71
In Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., Inc. ,72 the district
court determined that the scope of the state-created right is irrele-
vant in determining equivalence with rights under the federal stat-
ute.73 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied and
placed on the market substantial and important portions of its road-
way mileage guide.74 The court held that the Copyright Act would
63 Id. at 852.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 853.
67 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
68 Id. at 1533.
69 Id. at 1534.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1535. (Pointing out that additional elements such as requirements of
awareness or intent only alter the action's scope, not its nature, and thus do not satisfy
the test.). See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., No. 82C 2668 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11,
1986) (federal copyright law does not preempt state law unfair competition claims); and
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(plaintiff's claim involved "extra element of misrepresentation," which made his claim
"qualitatively different" from a copyright claim).
72 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
73 Id. at 739.
74 Id. at 728.
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preempt plaintiff's state law claim of misappropriation only if the
rights created under the state law were equivalent to those created
under the Copyright Act.75 The court found this test satisfied, "re-
gardless of whether the state-created protection is narrower or
broader than federal protection." '76
The district court in Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics77 created
a second test for determining whether the Copyright Act preempts a
state law by using "federal policy" considerations. That court relied
on what is known as the Sears-Compco doctrine:78 "[I]n certain in-
stances, an intellectual property which falls outside the protection of
either federal copyright or patent law may still be found to not be
entitled protection under state law regardless of theory because fed-
eral policy favors preemption of the area in question. ' 79 The Video-
tronics court applied this doctrine to the plaintiff's misappropriation
of trade secrets claim and denied relief under state law. The court
held that the Copyright Act protected plaintiff's property interest in
his software and that federal policy established a unitary and exclu-
sive regime of statutory copyright protection which cannot be sup-
plemented by state law protection."
Section 301 of the Copyright Act prohibits states from granting
rights equivalent to those provided by the Copyright Act. Courts
have developed two tests for determining whether the rights are
equivalent. For a state "shrink-wrap" law to be valid and enforcea-
ble8 ' under the "extra-element" test, it must prohibit actions addi-
tional to and qualitatively different from actions that violate the
Copyright Act's exclusive rights, such as reproduction or distribu-
tion. Under the "federal policy" test, the Copyright Act preempts
certain areas of protection, even if they do not now receive federal
protection, because state protection of these areas violates federal
policy.
75 Id. at 739. See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838,
856-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing the same two part preemption test from Harper & Row).
76 591 F. Supp. at 739.
77 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983).
78 The Sears-Compco doctrine is based on the holdings of two Supreme Court patent
cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (treating section 301 of the Copyright Act as a
codification of the Sears-Compco doctrine).
79 564 F. Supp. at 1476.
80 Id. at 1477.
81 Invalidity and non-enforceability in this context rest solely on the premise that
the state statute conflicts with federal law, thus violating the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
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II
COMPUTER SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS
"Shrink-wrap" license agreements are identifiable by their
means of acceptance. The purchaser indicates acceptance of the
terms of the license by tearing open the plastic wrapper enclosing
the software package.8 2 In all such license agreements, the copy-
right owner intends to retain title of the transferred copy, without
obtaining the licensee's signature. The licensee typically pays for
the software under a perpetual8 3 exclusive license agreement which
permits him to keep the software for his personal use with certain
limitations on his right to transfer, copy, use, or modify the
software.
A. Use of Traditional Licensing Agreements
Licensing became the primary means for a developer to transfer
computer software to the intended user while protecting trade
secrets.8 4 Under state trade secret law, causes of action arise only
when one party misappropriates the trade secret subject matter of
another party through a breach of confidentiality.8 5 Confidentiality
can only be established through physical protection or through con-
tracts with those who will come in contact with the trade secret.
When the computer program containing the trade secret is sold to
the public in the absence of a confidentiality arrangement, the secret
is disseminated and no cause of action under state trade secret law
can be maintained. 86
Before the growth of the microcomputer market, developers
custom designed software for individual corporate customers who
82 See, e.g., Stem, supra note 3, quoting from a typical license agreement:
You agree to the terms of this agreement by the act of opening the sealed
package.... Do not open the sealed package without first reading, un-
derstanding, and agreeing to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
You may return the software for a full refund before opening the sealed
package.
Id. at 53.
83 Most "shrink-wrap" licenses confer a perpetual right in the licensee to use the
software under the license terms. However, recognizing that a court might view such a
transaction as a sale rather than a license, a sample license agreement in Eidelman &
Shepherd, supra note 21, limits the term of the agreement to 50 years. This sample
reads: "This gives the user the right to use the program for more than [its] useful life
... at the same time, the user is not given a perpetual license ... which a court may
construe to have the effect of a sale passing permanent title to the... copy." Id. at 289.
84 Syrowick, supra note 17, at 294. ("Unlike a sale or assignment, which results in a
transfer of all [trade secret] rights, a license is a transfer of less than the whole trade
secret, and permits the owner to retain control of the use of the trade secret.").
85 Trade secret protection does not extend to information or ideas gained from
computer software through "legal" means such as reverse engineering or independent
invention. See Hyde, supra note 17, at 318-19.
86 Syrowick, supra note 17, at 294.
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signed contracts binding them to protect the subject matter of the
trade secret.8 7 With the proliferation of mass-marketed, generic
software "packages," this face-to-face bargaining between software
developer and user has become impossible. 88 Rather than abandon
the advantages of licensing software to users, developers resorted to
unilateral "shrink-wrap" license agreements to maintain control
over the copy after transfer to the user.
B. Purposes of Mass Market License Agreements
Software developers seek to combat the perceived problems of
software rental by using license agreements for mass-marketed
software. Software manufacturers rely on "shrink-wrap" license
agreements to protect their property rights in copyrighted software,
and thus avoid the difficulty of proving copyright infringement on a
case-by-case basis. Under the Copyright Act, rental store operators
may be contributory infringers89 of the copyright if their customers
made unauthorized copies of rented copyrighted software, and the
rental store operator knew of the offending activity. The copyright
owner could then bring contributory infringement actions against
rental stores, but he must first prove infringement on the part of the
rentee. Rather than pursue this indirect means of reaching rental
stores, the software developer can "license" his software with
prohibitions on subsequent transfer, including rental, and sue the
rental store directly for breach of contract if the software is ever
rented. The software developer thus hopes to end the rental market
for his software by driving the suppliers out of business, and dimin-
ishing rentees' unauthorized copying.
In addition to controlling the rental market for his software, the
software developer uses the "shrink-wrap" license agreement to
configure the transfer of possession of the copy as a "license" rather
87 See Note, Commercial Law--The Enforceability of Computer "Box-top"License Agreements
under the U.C.C., 7 WHrrrIER L. REv. 881, 883 (1985) (authored by James T. Peys) ("His-
torically, software publishers have required an end-user to sign a license agreement at
the time of the transaction.").
88 Mass-market computer software is purchased by consumers in retail stores or
through mail-order retailers. In most instances, the buyer has no contact with the pro-
ducer of the software package. See, e.g., Raysman & Brown, New Developments in "Shrink-
wrap" License Agreements, 194 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1 ("Direct transactions
between the software developer and the end user seldom occur... [and] [d]irect negoti-
ations with signed contracts have become impractical due to the volume of sales.");
Note, supra note 2, at 1359 ("Although the mainframe software industry's usage of li-
cense agreements is well established, the microcomputer software industry faces special
difficulties in licensing software.").
89 See, e.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable
as a 'contributory' infringer.").
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than a "sale" thereby depriving the end-user of his rights under the
"first sale" doctrine of the Copyright Act.90 If the software devel-
oper were to sell, rather than license, his software, the "first sale"
doctrine of section 109 of the Copyright Act would apply and elimi-
nate his ability to restrict subsequent transfers of the copy. There-
fore, the software developer must license the software to avoid
triggering the "first sale" doctrine.
C. Enforceability Without Validating State Legislation
The debate surrounding the enforceability of "shrink-wrap" li-
cense agreements centers on whether the seller's original offer in-
cludes the license agreement's terms, 91 or whether the seller
imposes these terms unilaterally on the buyer after the sale.92 Com-
mentators have characterized the "shrink-wrap" license agreement
as an unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, adhesion con-
tract because the license agreement's terms deprive the purchaser of
important rights which he has not relinquished voluntarily. 93 It is
possible, or in some cases even certain,94 that the buyer does not
know the license agreement's terms when he pays for the software.
Under the adhesion contract theory, such terms, because they are
not part of any agreement that the buyer has willingly or knowingly
entered into, are therefore not binding.
Furthermore, several commentators have concluded that the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") applies to this type of trans-
action,95 even though article 2 of the U.C.C. typically only applies to
sales96 of goods9 7 and not to licenses. Courts apply the U.C.C. to
90 See infra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text.
91 The terms "seller" and "buyer" are misnomers if the transaction is a lease rather
than a sale. However, given the uncertain nature of the ultimate transaction, I have used
these terms for simplicity.
92 See, e.g., Einhorn, supra note 2, at 513 (identifying three possible interpretations
of "shrink-wrap" license terms: "as imposing conditions subsequent to sale; as terms of
a reverse unilateral contract between publisher and end user; and as imposing condi-
tions precedent to sale.").
93 Stern, supra note 3, at 55 n.24 ("such a contract might be held unconscionable in
a consumer transaction under U.C.C. § 2-301."); Note, supra note 87, at 908-10 (con-
cluding, after discussion of unconscionability under section 2-302 of the U.C.C., that
"the terms [of box-top licenses] eliminate the consumers' opportunity and ability to pro-
tect their legal rights.").
94 See Einhorn, supra note 2, at 514 (mail-order purchasers are unable to read or
agree to terms of the agreement until after they have paid for the software).
95 Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35
EMoRY L.J. 853 (1986); Note, supra note 87.
96 Rodau, supra note 95, at 887 ("Although general agreement exists that the sale of
goods is subject to article 2, disagreement exists about whether transactions other than
pure sales are within the scope of article 2.").
97 See Note, supra note 2, at 1367 ("Packaged software ... probably constitutes a
good within the scope of the UCC.").
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licensing transactions that have all the attributes of sales of goods
despite the terminology used in the contract. Courts will therefore
apply the U.C.C. if the "licensee" pays all consideration at the in-
ception of the "license" period and receives a perpetual right of
possession from the "licensor."98
If a court finds the transaction to be a "sale" under the U.C.C.,
the Copyright Act's "first sale" doctrine invalidates the copyright
owner's attempt to restrict subsequent transfers of the copy. Model
license agreements typically include a limited duration license term
in order to make the transaction look less like a sale and thus avoid
the "first sale" doctrine.99 Since the law considers these transac-
tions sales rather than licenses, it seems unlikely that such "shrink-
wrap" license agreements are enforceable under the existing law of
most states.
III
STATE "SHRINK-WRAP" LAWS
Only Illinois and Louisiana currently have enacted "shrink-
wrap" license legislation. Both statutes are titled the "Software Li-
cense Enforcement Act" and both are based upon a model bill
drafted by a computer software developer. 100 These statutes ad-
dress the possible application of the U.C.C. and, by setting out re-
quirements for enforceability, attempt to standardize mass-market
licensing agreements and ensure their validity. The two state stat-
utes treat the enforceability of license terms against purchasers in
substantially the same way. The two statutes differ primarily in that
the Illinois statute contains an additional section on copyright
rights. 101
Both statutes first set out the requirements that "shrink-wrap"
licenses must meet in order to be enforceable.' 0 2 The software
packaging must include a conspicuously visible notice' 03 stating that
98 See Rodau, supra note 95, at 907 (licensing of software has many of the character-
istics of a sale); Note, supra note 2, at 1368 ("If the real economic effect of a transaction
is a direct sale, courts often will treat the transaction as a sale and apply the UCC, de-
spite what the transaction purports to be.").
99 Eidelman & Shepherd, supra, note 21, at 289.
100 Einhorn, supra note 2, at 518-19. The model bill was drafted by Vault Corpora-
tion, see infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
102 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1963 ("Any person
who acquires computer software.., shall be conclusively deemed to have accepted and
agreed to all the terms of the license agreement.").
1O ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803, § 3(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1963(1) ("A
written legend or notice is affixed to or packaged with the software... in such a manner
that the ... notice is clearly and conspicuously visible upon cursory examination of the
software and related packaging.").
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use of the software or opening of the sealed package will constitute
acceptance of the terms of the accompanying license agreement. 0 4
The purchaser must have the option not to accept the terms of the
agreement and to return the unopened or unused package for a full
refund of the purchase price. 105 The statutes provide that, if the
purchaser accepts the terms by the means indicated, he "shall be
conclusively deemed to have accepted and agreed to all the terms of
the license agreement for such software."' 06
The subsequent sections of both statutes enumerate specific
provisions of conforming license agreements that are enforceable.
First, the licensor may retain title in the copy.10 7 If the licensor re-
tains title, purchasers are conclusively presumed to accept license
terms such as: (1) prohibition on any copying, limits on the pur-
poses for which copies can be made, or limits on the number of
copies which can be made,108 (2) prohibition or limitation of the
right to modify, adopt, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, disas-
semble, or create derivative works from the software,' 0 9 (3) prohibi-
tion on subsequent transfer, assignment, rental, sale, or other
disposition of the copy,"10 and, in the case of the Illinois statute (4)
prohibition on use of the software by more than one computer or by
more than one user at the same time."'
The most striking difference between the Illinois and Louisiana
104 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803, § 3(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:1963(3) ("Any
use of the software.., or... [a]ny opening of a sealed package, envelope, or container
in which the software ... is contained will constitute acceptance of the terms of the
accompanying license agreement.").
105 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803, § 3(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1963(4) ("any-
one who receives the software ... and does not accept and agree to the terms of the
accompanying license agreement may, within a reasonable time, return the unused, un-
opened software... for a full refund.").
106 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1963. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803, § 3 ("A
person who acquires a copy of computer software will be conclusively deemed to have
accepted and agreed to [the] provisions of the license agreement.").
107 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804, § 4(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964(1) ("Pro-
visions for the retention by the licensor of title to the copy.").
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804, § 4(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964(2) ("pro-
visions for the prohibition of any copying of the copy.., for any purpose and/or limita-
tions on the purposes for which copies . . . can be made and/or limitations on the
number of copies ... which can be made.").
109 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804, § 4(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964(3) ("pro-
visions for the prohibition or limitation of rights to modify and/or adapt the copy... in
any way, including without limitation prohibitions on translating, reverse engineering,
decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative works based on the computer
software.").
110 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804, § 4(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964(4) ("pro-
visions for prohibitions on further transfer, assignment, rental, sale, or other disposition
of that copy or any other copies made from that copy.").
111 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804, § 4(5) ("provisions for prohibition on the use
of the copy.., on more than one computer.., or... by more than one individual user
at the same time.").
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statutes is a provision in the Illinois Software License Enforcement
Act purporting to give "shrink-wrap" licensees the same rights they
would enjoy under the Copyright Act if they had bought the
software instead of licensing it.112 The drafters apparently hoped
that this provision would avoid conflicts between the provisions of
software license agreements and the rights granted under the Copy-
right Act.
IV
VAULT CORP. V. QUAID SOFTWARE LTD.
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,113 the only case to examine
either of the state "shrink-wrap" license statutes, tests the validity of
specific "shrink-wrap" legislation, as well as the ultimate enforce-
ability of licensing transactions. Although the Vault court only ad-
dressed a few of the enumerated license terms and their corr-
esponding statutory provisions, the court's reasoning suggests that
the entire "shrink-wrap" licensing system is unenforceable.
Vault Corporation ("Vault") manufacturers "copy protection"
software which it encodes onto floppy disks and sells to other
software developers who, in turn, use the encoded disks to sell their
software to consumers. 114 Vault's software contains a security sys-
tem which frustrates attempts by third parties to copy the software
Vault's customers have placed on the disk. 115 Vault included a
"shrink-wrap" license agreement on the packaging of its software" 16
which met the notice requirements of the Louisiana "shrink-wrap"
statute. 117 Quaid Software Ltd. ("Quaid") purchased such a disk
from Vault and developed a software utility which enables users to
make copies of Vault's "copy protected" disks, thereby defeating
the security system developed to prevent unauthorized copying of
112 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 807, § 7. This section states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect or alter any existing indi-
vidual or business rights granted by the copyright laws of the United
States [the Copyright Act], as now or hereafter amended, that such indi-
vidual or business would have were such individual or business a purchaser of a
copy of the computer software that is the subject of the license
agreement.
Id. (emphasis added)
113 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
114 Id. at 753-54.
115 Id. at 754.
116 Id. at 753.
117 Its terms provided that title of the copy would remain with Vault, that the copy
was licensed to the end-user for "internal use," and that the user could not "transfer,
sub-license, rent, lease, convey, copy, modify, translate, convert to another program-
ming language, decompile or disassemble" the software without Vault's prior consent.
Id. at 755.
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software.118
Vault brought a diversity action under the Software License En-
forcement Act' 19 and state trade secret law, seeking a preliminary
injunction to prevent Quaid from violating its "shrink-wrap" license
agreement.120 Vault alleged that Quaid had assented to the licens-
ing agreement by opening and using the software. Vault further al-
leged that, in developing its copy utility, Quaid improperly violated
the accepted licensing agreement terms by disassembling and
decompiling Vault's program and that Vault was therefore entitled
to bring a state law claim for misappropriation of its trade secret.'21
The district court held that the license agreement was an adhe-
sion contract because one party imposed its terms on the other after
the transaction was complete. The court would enforce the license
agreement only if the Software License Enforcement Act was valid
and enforceable and did not conflict with the Copyright Act.122 The
court held that several provisions of the Louisiana "shrink-wrap"
law violated the exclusivity of the Copyright Act and therefore the
corresponding provisions of the Vault licensing agreement were un-
enforceable. In invalidating three provisions of the state "shrink-
wrap" statute that conflicted with the Copyright Act, the Vault court
held that: (1) the statutory provision allowing the licensor to pro-
hibit copying by the licensee "for any purpose" violated section
117,123 (2) the statutory provision granting the licensor the right to
prepare derivative works was an "equivalent right" to the exclusive
right of section 106(2),124 and (3) the statutory provision creating a
perpetual bar on copying of the licensor's software violated the du-
ration of copyright established in section 302(a). 125
The court held that those terms of the Vault license agreement
which were based on the invalid provisions of the Louisiana statute
were unenforceable as "contrary to the policies of the federal Copy-
right Act."' 126 The court denied Vault's motion for a preliminary
injunction holding that Quaid's disassembly and decompilation did
not violate an enforceable license agreement and therefore could
not sustain a claim of trade secret misappropriation.
Vault appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district
118 Id.
119 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1961-1966.
120 655 F. Supp. at 752.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 761-62.
123 Id. at 762.
124 Id. at 762-63.
125 Id. at 763.
126 Id
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court decision.' 27 Citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., t 28 the
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the provi-
sion of Vault's license agreement prohibiting decompilation or dias-
sembly of its program was unenforceable because it "clearly
'touches upon an area' of federal copyright law."' 129 The court sug-
gested further that the Copyright Act might also preempt other pro-
visions of Louisiana's License Act not at issue in this case. 130
V
THE STATE OF "SHRINK-WRAP" LICENSES AFTER VAULT
A. Evaluation of the Vault Holding
The Vault court correctly concluded that three provisions of the
Louisiana "shrink-wrap" statute were invalid. The court held that
the Copyright Act preempted these provisions because they pro-
tected rights equivalent to or in direct conflict with the rights estab-
lished under the Copyright Act. If the court had enforced the
restrictive provisions of Vault's "shrink-wrap" license agreement,
Vault would have gained an extended protection of its intellectual
property rights unavailable under the federal copyright statute.
The state law prohibition on copying duplicates section 106
(1) 131 of the Copyright Act. Under the Louisiana act, a licensor who
includes a term prohibiting copying would have both a federal and a
state cause of action against a purchaser who made unauthorized
copies of the software and sold them. This is an "equivalent right"
and is preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act. Similarly, if
under the same license agreement the purchaser made an archival
copy of the software, or made a copy as required by the operation of
the software, he would be in violation of the license term, and the
licensor would have a state cause of action. This right conflicts with
section 117132 of the Copyright Act and is therefore invalid.
The state law prohibition on copying also enlarges the protec-
tion offered under section 302(a) 133 of the Copyright Act. The li-
censor's attempt to extend his right to prohibit unauthorized
copying beyond the life of the copyright contradicts the federal stat-
ute. If the license term purports to give the licensor the right to
127 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
128 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
129 847 F.2d at 270.
130 "[W]e hold that at least this provision of Louisiana's License Act is preempted by
federal law .. " Id. (emphasis added).
131 "[TIhe owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to . . .
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies. . ." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). See infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
132 See infra note 19.
133 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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prohibit certain types of copying for a term equal to or shorter than
that of the Copyright Act, the term would be preempted as an
equivalent right under section 301(a). Regardless of the exact
wording of the license term or the scope of the protection offered
under the state statute, state law cannot grant rights to copyright
owners protecting them from unauthorized copying of their
software.
Finally, license provisions that prohibit licensees from prepar-
ing derivative works are equivalent in their effect to the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works vested in the copyright owner by
section 106(2)134 of the Copyright Act. By creating a derivative
work from copyrighted software, an infringer cannot give rise to
both a state and a federal cause of action. The Copyright Act
preempts any state statute which purports to give such a right.
B. Validity of Other "Shrink-wrap" License Terms
In addition to the license and statutory provisions that the Vault
court held invalid, other aspects of the Louisiana and Illinois stat-
utes conflict with federal copyright law. License terms that limit
both the number of copies and the purposes for which they can be
made conflict with and improperly enlarge the copyright owner's
rights under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act gives the owner
of a copy of copyrighted software the right to make one copy for
archival purposes and to make a copy or adaptation as required for
using the software.13 5 A license agreement that explicitly provides
for these same rights would essentially grant rights equivalent to
those established by the Copyright Act. On the other hand, a li-
cense agreement that restricts the user's right to make such copies
or adaptations would conflict with the rights granted under the
Copyright Act. In either case, a license term purporting to affect the
purchaser's right to make archival copies, or to make copies or ad-
aptations required for the utilization of the software is invalid and
unenforceable because it either grants an equivalent right or con-
flicts with rights granted under the Copyright Act.
Enforcing prohibitions on a licensee's further transfer of a copy
of software presents a problem for the software industry itself. If
enforced by the courts, this "anti-rental" provision would end the
software rental business. Potential consumers of expensive software
packages would therefore have little opportunity to test and evalu-
ate products before purchasing them. Although software develop-
ers legitimately are concerned with copyright violations that result
134 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
135 17 U.S.C. § 117.
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from the availability of inexpensive rental software, consumer opin-
ion may turn against developers who routinely sue software rental
businesses for violation of "shrink-wrap" contracts. A similar phe-
nomenon occurred when software developers resorted to "copy
protection" schemes to protect their proprietary interest in
software.136 Consumer demand for software that was not copy pro-
tected, and protests against protected software, led many software
manufacturers to abandon this practice.
The "first sale" doctrine presents particular problems for "anti-
rental" provisions of software license agreements because, if the
transfer of software is viewed as a sale rather than a license or bail-
ment, the copyright owner cannot enforce anti-rental prohibitions
or subsequent transfers. A court triggers the "first sale" doctrine of
section 109 when it finds that the transfer under a "shrink-wrap"
license is a sale under article 2 of the U.C.C. Section 109(a) reflects
a policy that gives consumers "unfettered use" of copyrighted
goods for which they have paid consideration to the copyright
owner.' 37 By validating anti-rental license terms the Software Li-
cense Enforcement Acts directly oppose the free alienation policy
that the Copyright Act provides under section 109.
Section 7 of the Illinois statute presents a two-fold problem.
First, this section impermissibly intrudes into the Copyright Act's
exclusive domain by expanding the copyright protection covering
sales to include licenses.' 38 Although the Copyright Act gives cer-
tain specific rights to purchasers of copyrighted software, it gives no
rights to licensees. Congress sought to maintain the distinction be-
tween a sale and a license by allowing the copyright owner to retain
certain rights under a license that he would lose if he sold a copy of
the copyrighted work. For example, under an enforceable license,
the copyright owner retains the right to restrict subsequent transfers
of the licensed copy, while he does not retain this right if he sells the
copy. Software developers' interest in "shrink-wrap" licensing rests
upon this different treatment. Section 301 of the Copyright Act in-
validates section 7 of the Illinois statute because section 7 denies the
operation of this distinction by granting licensees equivalent rights
to those enjoyed by purchasers. It also defeats the licensing agree-
ment's purpose by limiting the ability of licensors to control the dis-
position of the licensed copy.
Additionally, section 7 conflicts with other sections of the Illi-
nois statute itself. By stating that "Nothing in the Act shall be con-
strued to affect or alter any existing . . . rights granted by the
136 Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 21, at 285.
137 Stern, supra note 3, at 62.
138 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 807, § 7.
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copyright laws," 139 and then granting those very rights to licensees,
this section directly contradicts section 4 of the Illinois statute. Sec-
tion 4 enforces license provisions that deny licensees the rights
given to purchasers by the Copyright Act. Although the Copyright
Act does not prevent license agreements from limiting the rights of
licensees as compared with purchasers, section 7 purports to give
licensees the same rights purchasers enjoy under the Copyright Act.
The Illinois statute is therefore internally inconsistent. If licensees
enjoy the same rights as purchasers under section 7, then section 4,
which enforces license provisions restricting those rights, is invalid.
In either case, section 7 is invalid; the Copyright Act preempts it,
and section 4 of the Illinois act contradicts it.
C. Conclusion
Although the object of the state Software License Enforcement
Acts is to clarify the enforceability of certain terms in "shrink-wrap"
license agreements, the Vault court held several provisions of the
Louisiana statute invalid. An extension of the Vault reasoning sug-
gests that the Copyright Act also preempts the remaining provisions
of the Louisiana and Illinois statutes. While courts have not settled
the issue of preemption under section 301 of the Copyright Act, a
strong argument exists that computer software developers are try-
ing to expand impermissibly the Copyright Act's protection by using
mass market "licensing" agreements to curtail pirating of their
software; this expansion is impermissible because the Copyright Act
preempts "shrink-wrap" license statutes.
Software developers must therefore turn to alternative means
to protect their intellectual property interests in software. Develop-
ers must rely on the rights and remedies provided under the Copy-
right Act to protect their exclusive right to make copies of their
software. Although the remedies available under federal law may
not sufficiently discourage unauthorized and illegal copying of copy-
righted software, copyright owners cannot seek to create equivalent
rights under state law. The software industry could bring a series of
statutory damage suits against individual copyright infringers to
send a message to the public that the industry will not tolerate unau-
thorized copying of copyrighted software, but this approach is likely
to be expensive and ineffective. Without the benefit of federal statu-
tory change, copyright owners will have to accept conditions as they
exist today.
The Copyright Act, although a relatively young statute, is sub-
ject to amendment. The protection offered to copyright owners of
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computer software has been extended since the original enactment
of the Copyright Act. Thus, rather than pursue further efforts at
securing state "shrink-wrap" legislation that the Copyright Act
preempts, the software industry should concentrate their efforts on
the reform of the Copyright Act. However, such reform may signifi-
cantly alter the balance of rights currently enjoyed by the copyright
owner and the purchaser of a copy of the copyrighted software.
Nevertheless, the ease with which software can be copied presents
problems of controlling copying which do not exist in other copy-
righted media. The Copyright Act is therefore the framework
within which reform must be made. Attempts to circumvent its limi-
tations are fruitless.
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